The EU Must Prepare for a Cold Peace With Russia

 

 

 

UNIFYING THE EU

The EU must rise to the challenge of Russian aggression by putting its house in order. To do so, the bloc needs a stronger foreign policy. That requires more engagement from the member states, especially at the level of the leaders. Foreign policy should be on the agenda of each summit of EU heads of state and government. The European Council, which brings together these leaders and is headed by Donald Tusk, may become a driver for a more united and coherent EU foreign policy.

 

In addition, the EU must make sure that direct Russian influence in member states cannot undermine the integrity of the bloc. Russia is very active when it comes to spying and uses various tools to gain influence over officials, policymakers, and the media in the EU, with the goal of weakening EU and transatlantic coherence. There is a growing risk that Russian influence might compromise the integrity of the EU’s political processes. To guard against this risk, EU member states should be more active in preventing espionage.

 

The response to the Kremlin’s propaganda, however, must to a large extent be left to civil society actors. While the Kremlin can directly use the media to spread its message, democratic governments cannot dominate the gathering and dissemination of news. But they can and should take measures to level the playing field by supporting independent media and by helping civil-society efforts to counter the Kremlin’s propaganda activities.

 

Ensuring the integrity of policymaking also affects the issue of energy. Member states that are highly dependent on Russian gas and oil are vulnerable to Russian pressure. The EU needs to build a common, integrated energy market, and it needs to further diversify its energy supply. Energy policy should no longer be driven predominantly by considerations about price and environmental aspects, as it has been in the past. Geopolitical factors must fully enter into the equation as well: the fact is that energy dependency can be used as a political weapon.

 

MAINTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Russia today sees itself in opposition to the system of European and global governance. The EU must accept that reality and learn to live with a confrontation that it almost desperately tried to prevent. There is no way back to the status quo ante.

 

Preparing for a more adversarial relationship with Russia is very difficult for the EU. The union has no appetite for conflict; indeed, avoiding conflict is at the core of the European integration project. The entire postmodern order that the Europeans have built, under the umbrella of U.S. protection and strategic leadership, is meant to end power politics and conflict and to replace it with a system of interconnectedness, economic exchange, open borders, and win-win policies of compromise. Russia has refused to enter this postmodern EU sphere and has rejected the many invitations that Berlin and Brussels have given Moscow to engage with them.

 

If Russia successfully manages to undermine the system of rules that have governed globalization, other countries are likely to follow its example. Once a multipolar order―one in which a small number of powerful countries force weaker ones into submission―becomes the new norm, China may use this newfound space to redouble its efforts to dominate its own neighborhood. Some regional powers such as Turkey or Iran could also be encouraged to push harder for a recognized sphere of influence.

 

The EU, together with the United States, needs to push back against Russia to maintain and strengthen the multilateral system enshrined in the UN charter and many other international agreements. The basic principles of that system are sovereignty and territorial integrity; and its main feature is that smaller states have the same rights as stronger states. In the EU, where multilateralism has become especially strong, tiny Malta can in many cases block mighty Germany.

 

EUROPE’S BIGGEST TEST

The easiest way for the EU to get out of the confrontation with Russia would be to disengage from the post-Soviet space and seal NATO’s external border. But that would be shortsighted. In such a scenario, there would likely be permanent, low-level conflict and warfare in Eastern Europe, as the countries in the region are not ready to accept full submission to Moscow. They have developed their own identity and aspirations since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia, for its part, would likely turn into an even more revisionist, imperialist-minded, aggressive, and militarized power. It would be an illusion to think that the EU could be safe and prosperous in such a neighborhood.

 

Only by stepping up engagement, by helping countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to stabilize, and by enlarging the sphere of liberal democracy and market economy can the EU bring the post-Soviet space closer to the postmodern multilateral order that has proven so beneficial for Europe. This is a generational task―and the EU’s biggest test so far.