The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Failures

This should have been a wake-up call for the Brotherhood. Reaching out to the opposition, granting concessions to enlarge its ruling coalition, and building a consensual democracy might have been effective political choices for the Brotherhood. These steps might have enabled the movement to stabilize the situation, enhance its standing vis-à-vis the old state, and mitigate the lack of trust that existed. However, despite initial attempts at such a strategy,⁷ the Brotherhood, to its own detriment, ultimately chose the exact opposite path, adamantly refusing to make any concessions and alienating not just secular groups but even Islamist allies like the Salafist Nour Party.⁸

The Brotherhood also suffered from political inconsistency and the lack of a long-term strategic vision. Brotherhood leaders—self-styled political tacticians—inconsistently caved to the demands of some political actors, both in rhetoric and in policy, just to maximize short-term tactical gains, regardless of the long-term strategic implications.

As such, the Brotherhood appeared to shift alliances frequently. First, Brotherhood leaders appealed to the conservative middle class, which was hungry for stability, to gain their votes in the March 2011 constitutional referendum and the November 2011 parliamentary elections. Only a few months later, Brotherhood leaders targeted Islamist voters during the first round of the 2012 presidential elections, calling on them to vote for the “Islamist candidate” Morsi. Shortly thereafter, they began courting anti-old-state revolutionary factions to gain revolutionary legitimacy and secure this badly needed constituency in the second round of the 2012 elections against the Mubarakist contender, Shafiq.

While Morsi was in power, the Brotherhood engaged other Islamists (including some of the most outspoken radical Salafists and jihadists) to build a solid base of support with which to counter rising anti-Islamist sentiment. At the same time, however, the group, in its executive and legislative decrees, decisions, and draft legislation, caved to the demands of old-state institutions, such as the military, police, and business elites. When viewed together, the Brotherhood’s actions seemed incoherent. Its attempts to appeal to different political factions at different times appeared opportunistic and satisfied no one. Moreover, other factions saw nothing in the Brotherhood’s actions except arrogance, self-serving behavior, and ideologically driven bids for exclusive domination. The end result was the alienation of all possible allies and mounting hostility toward the Brotherhood from all corners. In this context, it became easy for the old state to turn against the Brotherhood since it could count on the support of the non-Islamist opposition, Gulf patrons, and, most importantly, wide segments of the population exhausted by three years of instability and deteriorating economic conditions.

Admittedly, many non-Islamist elites would have remained avowedly anti-Islamist and lent their support to the old state regardless of any attempts the Islamists made to build confidence. Nevertheless, it was the Brotherhood’s responsibility, given its sheer power, to either lead the Islamists toward the acceptance of ideological concessions or opt for a gradualist approach instead of rapidly seeking political domination. While the first option was not feasible in light of ideological intransigence among Islamists (particularly Salafists), the second would have been possible had Brotherhood leaders not badly misread the situation.

Still, the Brotherhood’s poor political performance was not just the result of a tactical mishandling of the sequence of events. More profoundly, it can be traced to the Brotherhood’s peculiar type of ideology and organization—both sources of additional failings.

Ideological Failures

The Muslim Brotherhood’s demise was not simply a failure of its political party; it represented a failure of the organization’s grand ideological project. Ideologically, the Brotherhood failed in four key ways.

First, it proved overly willing to sacrifice ideological principles for short-term political gains. That ensured that the Brotherhood’s rise to power would represent not a triumph of its unique brand of Islamism but rather a political ascent resulting from calculated power politics that could easily turn against the Brothers when conditions changed. And that is what actually happened. Second, the Brotherhood’s Islamist ideology lacked sophistication and substance, and the organization failed to construct an authentic, nuanced vision for its “Islamic project.” Third, the group’s claims to Islamic legitimacy were in contrast to specific policy decisions its leaders made, creating a gap between the group’s ideology and its performance in a leadership role. Finally, core components of the Brotherhood’s ideology were undemocratic, putting the organization at odds with efforts toward a moderate democratic transition in Egypt, a shift of which it purported to be a part.

Power Politics Trumps Ideology

The Brotherhood failed to make its way to power through an ideological triumph or as the outcome of the societal process of Islamization that its leaders promised. In other words, the Brotherhood was unable to fashion itself as an Egyptian version of the Iranian Khomeinists, who founded their own Islamic state by gaining societal hegemony. The Brotherhood also failed to be a Muslim version of European Christian democratic parties.⁹ It could have pursued this strategy by situating itself somewhere at the center of the Egyptian ideological political spectrum, as some of its “reformist” leaders hoped it would. This aim of centrism came to naught, as it mixed religious centrism with political centrism.¹⁰

Instead of achieving a triumph of ideology, the Brotherhood’s ascent to power was a product of normal and calculable power politics, including coalition building, political maneuvering, and placating different interests and power centers within society. This entailed a great deal of compromise on ideological and religious principles. The Brotherhood also inflated the political component of its Islamist mission.¹¹ Political power, instead of societal Islamization based on changing the hearts and minds of the population, became the movement’s key objective.