Jul

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Failures

Moves Toward Domination

Throughout the eighteen days of demonstrations in January and February 2011 that toppled Mubarak, the Brotherhood was careful not to be perceived as taking control of the protest movement in terms of its slogans, discourse, or political demands. Brotherhood leaders were aware that the protests were not dominated by Islamist ideas but rather oriented toward the broad goals of freedom and social justice. They were also aware that other political groups and movements were instrumental in mobilizing demonstrators and writing the narrative of the uprising. As a result, Brotherhood leaders were careful not to alienate other protesters by expressing their Islamist views too overtly.

After Mubarak’s fall, a smart strategy would have been for the Brotherhood to restrain its power and moderate its political objectives for the time being. It could have supported an expedited constitution-writing process, endorsing an ad hoc panel to draft the document, with members representing all political and ideological factions and a composition not tied to the outcome of parliamentary elections. In the spring of 2011, the revolution was still fresh, and the institutions of the old state, including the military, police, bureaucracy, and judiciary, were still on the defensive. At that time, a united revolutionary front could arguably have secured better constitutional provisions regarding civil-military relations, checks and balances, political freedoms, and democracy.

The Islamists would not have been satisfied with the limited role for Islamic sharia that the new constitution would likely have embraced. Yet a calculated power-sharing pact could still have secured a place for Islamists in the system without intimidating or alienating secular revolutionary and reformist groups. Such an arrangement could also have allowed the Brotherhood to escape the regime’s crackdown that happened two years later.

A workable partnership could have been established allowing the Brotherhood’s organizational and popular prowess to support a united front in negotiations with the old state. In terms of the state’s democratic character, the final outcome would probably not have been much better than the 2012 or 2014 constitutions—in both cases, the old state emerged as a winner. But at least the process would not have divided the antigovernment demonstrators of early 2011 or polarized society to such an extent. Furthermore, the threat of a Mubarak loyalist assuming the presidency would have been strongly diminished if the Brotherhood had thrown its electoral weight behind a pro-change revolutionary or reformist figure. Even if a Mubarak loyalist such as Ahmed Shafiq had made it to the presidency, he would have had to struggle with an already-ratified, restrictive new constitution, sustained economic challenges, and a political opposition led by both secular parties and Islamists whose reputation had not yet been tarnished.

However, this is not the path the Brotherhood chose to take. Instead, the movement prematurely shifted its political approach after Mubarak’s downfall. To the fear and dismay of many in society, the Brotherhood opted to flex its political muscles, excluding and looking down on other political movements. The Islamists in general threw their weight behind an electoral path designed to make them the leading force within elected institutions and therefore assumed the burden of governance in both the parliament and presidency. This made the Brotherhood the sole negotiator with the military and other institutions of the old state. The Brotherhood sought to defer the drafting of a new constitution until after parliamentary elections—a sequence that Brotherhood leaders believed could provide the group with legitimacy as a representative of both the people and the revolution. Accordingly, the referendum of March 19, 2011, on constitutional amendments, which both the Brotherhood and the old state backed, postponed the constitution-writing process until the following year—after the election of a new parliament.

Many factors led to the Brotherhood’s shift in political tactics, including the group’s nonrevolutionary character, its type of ideology and organization, and its fear of being sidelined by a constitution-writing process dominated by secular liberals and leftist elites. Also significant were the Brotherhood’s deluded belief in the power of its massive comparative advantage and encouragement from the old state itself, which preferred to negotiate with conservative and organized actors like the Brothers. This path secured some initial tactical gains, including the appeasement of the Brotherhood’s broad Islamist grass roots and the bolstering of the group’s foothold in the political system. Yet ultimately, it cost them greater losses.

The shift was also the result of the Brotherhood leadership underestimating the meaning of the 2011 uprising. The Brotherhood viewed the unrest as a heavenly gift that rewarded the group for its past sacrifices and eradicated all constraints that Mubarak had placed on it. Brotherhood leaders were therefore totally occupied with how to seize this golden opportunity, maximize their political gains, and dominate the post-Mubarak political sphere—regardless of the implications of their approach on the prospects for Egypt’s democratic transformation and even their own long-term interests. But given the magnitude of past government failures and the Brotherhood’s own lack of a genuine political project, voluntarily opting to take full responsibility for the post-Mubarak political system was political suicide.²