G20 and Global Governance: Can it Do Better?

 

 

G20 Can Do Better

G20, for all its weaknesses, presents a unique opportunity to do better. Some of its weaknesses just have to be accepted. It is a distraction to argue about the membership (which reflects the specific circumstances when the original G20 group came together). There is no answer to the unsatisfactory compromise between all-inclusive representation (whose weaknesses are demonstrated in the UN and other universal-representation bodies) and effectiveness. G20 is probably already above optimal size and the issue has to be addressed through outreach and linkages with other organisations, rather than by attempting to restructure the membership.

 

The central fact is that G20 is the meeting which brings together the top world leaders. G7 no longer represents the global power realities. Other leaders’ meetings have sub-global agendas. Sure, the G20 agenda is at the same time too narrow (leaving out quite a few of the issues mentioned above) and too wide (covering issues which are either covered by other global institutions or are largely domestic matters).

 

It is also true that when the leaders meet, they will talk about whatever is most on their minds at the time. This means that G20 will often be diverted and distracted by the global political issues of the day, such as Ukraine.

 

Need to Address G20’s Unwieldy Structure

It would, however, be possible to sharpen the structure, although this would trespass on the fiercely-defended territory of existing global agencies. The short-hand for such a structure might see the G20 as being – to borrow a phrase – “one G to rule them all”. The Leaders could see their role as a steering committee, to offer advice and guidance, making their own priorities clear to the whole range of relevant international bodies.

 

These groupings, in turn, would retain their own independence and governance structures, but they would know that where there was a strong message with a high degree of unanimity coming out of G20, the voting weight behind this message could, ultimately, determine the attitude in their own institution.

 

This approach does not require a revolution in global governance. It would be enough to start with a few issues (say, the deficient representation in the IMF and World Bank). The prestige of a near-unanimous call from G20 might shift the domestic blockages which at present prevent resolution. Taxation issues provide another specific example where a clear message supporting the OECD’s existing efforts on this topic should be enough to promote progress on the global front. Climate issues seem ripe for this kind of approach, where the detailed issue stays with the specialized body (in this case the UNFCCC), but the recalcitrants will be pressured by the potential power of a strong G20 message.

 

G20 is an unwieldy arrangement, without the continuity of a secretariat or permanent chair. It is, however, the best we have to tackle the long list of global governance deficiencies.

 

Stephen Grenville is NTUC Professor of International Economic Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney and a former Deputy Governor and Board Member of the Reserve Bank of Australia.