Fiery Cross Reef And Strategic Implications For Taiwan

The construction of a major base on Fiery Cross Reef has the potential to upend the strategic structure in the Spratly Islands. It could also tip the balance of power in South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes in PRC’s favor. If a line is drawn in the Spratly archipelago, starting from Spratly Island and extending in the direction from southwest to northeast to reach Thitu Island, Fiery Cross Reef is located in the middle of this line. After the airstrip is built on the reef and military facilities are installed on other occupied reefs the PLA Air Force and Navy will be able to project power further down south to the center part of the South China Sea in the Spratly area would have profound impact on not only military planning of the claimant states in the sea but also other countries concerned such as the United States, Japan, and India.

Vietnam occupied Spratly Island and built a 610-meter long runway in 1973. The Philippines took Thitu Island in 1971 and added a 1,300-meter long runway four years later. Southwest of Thitu lies Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly archipelago, and the only one with fresh water in the area, which has been under Republic of China’s effective control since 1956 and has a 1,200-meter runway. Along the line (see map below) there are five notable land features, all of which were taken by the PRC in 1988: Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, McKennan Reef, and Cuarteron Reef. Land reclamation activities are also undertaken on these reefs by the PRC. It was reported that helipad will be built and helicopters will be deployed on Cuarteron Reef.

The strategic advantages of an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef include a base for reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned system, shorter resupply routes, and a basis for anti-submarine warfare equipment. For the PRC, this land feature could fulfill the strategic role of an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” In addition, the PRC’s strategic reach could extend from Sanya nuclear submarine base in Hainan to Woody Island of the Paracel archipelago, and then further south to Fiery Cross Reef of the Spratly Islands. Taiwan is also heavily dependent upon importation by sea of fuel, food and other materials, so the security of sea lines of communication is of prime importance to Taipei.

The PRC has claimed a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, because it is the only country without an island-based runway in the Spratlys. After Taiwan built an airstrip on the largest island in the Spratly archipelago, Beijing had made efforts to seek cooperation with Taipei on maritime interests in the South China Sea, including possible use of Taiwan’s facilities on Taiping Island, but without avail. Due to security and foreign policy considerations as well as policy pressure and concern from the U.S. government, the Ma Ying-jeou administration has made its position clear that Taiwan will not cooperate with PRC on issues related to South China Sea territorial disputes.

After the completion of the Chinese land reclamation projects on Fiery Cross Reef, the strategic importance of Taiwan’s Taiping Island will decline. The need for Beijing to seek permission from Taiwan for possible use of Taiping Island or Cross-Strait cooperation in the Spratly Islands is on the wane. At the same time, it is possible that that the PRC may take action against Taiping Island for the purpose of pushing Taiwan to move closer to Beijing’s policy agenda. This includes calls for Cross-Strait dialogue and efforts to deter Taiwan from moving toward independence or abandoning the U-shaped (11-dash) line claim in the South China Sea, which may be possibilities if there is a DPP victory in Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election.