Assessing U.S. Policy In The South China Sea

Among several other policy recommendations in the report, our findings support efforts to help South Sea littoral states help themselves through improvements in surveillance, command and control, and policing of their respective maritime domains. The United States also needs to be completely committed to a very long term, dedicated effort to improve the Armed Forces of the Philippine’s maritime capabilities. Both sides need to agree on what constitutes an AFP “minimum credible deterrent,” and enact a plan to achieve it.

When it comes to U.S. posture, our CNA report recommends that naval and air presence in the South China Sea should be a visible, daily occurrence. To that end, increasing the duration, a defacto increase in operational presence, of U.S. exercises with South China Sea littoral states and expanding them by inviting participation from other Asian maritime states, such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and possibly India, will illustrate that other maritime states are concerned about stability in the South China Sea.

Finally, Washington should ensure that planned U.S. military posture and capability improvements in East Asia are portrayed as symbols of reassurance and stability-oriented presence and are not characterized as attempts to confront China directly. Policymakers should emphasize that the objective of the military portion of the administration’s Rebalance strategy is to ensure that the United States can fulfil security responsibilities to U.S. allies and friends because it is capable of assured access whenever and wherever it may be required.

Rear Admiral (Ret) Michael McDevitt is a Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses. During his Navy career, Rear Admiral McDevitt held four at-sea commands, including command of an aircraft carrier battle group.